

Marie Guillot (Essex)

'Phenomenal concepts of self and time'

I want to make a case for the view that some of what are usually regarded as indexical concepts are really phenomenal concepts. In earlier work, I defended a more specific version of this claim for the particular case of the concept of self. However, this raises a number of objections, some having to do with the controversial nature of the self-experience a phenomenal concept of self would be anchored in. I think these objections can be answered; but because the debate on the subjective character of consciousness is unsettled, and the relevant empirical evidence is difficult to interpret, the answers will be unpersuasive to some. In this talk I try a different strategy. I look at the parallel claim that some temporal concepts are phenomenal concepts. I make a case for the temporal claim based on a conceptual point, and on an argument using clearer-cut experimental data on mental time-travel.